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With the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,' Congress
completed the most comprehensive and far reaching revision of
the Tax Code since 1969. Taxation of certain international
transactions received particular attention in the Act, especially
those implicated in the Congressional attempt to regulate tax
avoidance schemes. One of the most pervasive, or at least one
of the most attractive, of such tax avoidance schemes had been
the use of the foreign situs trust.
It is difficult to ascertain just how extensively foreign
trusts have been employed in the past.2 On one hand, it is easy
to succumb to the suspicion that foreign trusts have been more
* Assistant Director of the Program of Advanced Professional Development, Uni-
versity of Denver College of Law; B.A., 1972; J.D., 1975, University of Denver.
** A.B., 1975, Harvard University; J.D. candidate, University of Denver.
1. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 [hereinafter cited as the Act or the 1976 Tax
Reform Act] was passed by Congress and was signed by the President on October 4,
1976, as Pub. L. No. 94-455. Citations to the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954
[hereinafter cited as INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 and referred to as the Code] are to the
version in force immediately prior to the enactment of the 1976 Tax Reform Act, unless
otherwise noted.
2. Prior to the 1976 Tax Reform Act, there had never been any periodic reporting
requirements which would have enabled the Treasury Department to compile statistics
regarding the year-to-year operation of foreign trusts after their establishment by U.S.
citizens. The first of any foreign trust reporting provisions, in fact, was passed by
Congress in the Revenue Act of 1962, which simply required that, upon the creation
of, or the transfer of property to, a foreign trust, the grantor or transferor file such forms
as the Secretary might prescribe. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6048. Apparently, from
1962 until December 31, 1973, a total of 1391 of the prescribed returns, Form 3520, were
filed with the Service. Shop Talk, 42 J. TAX. 63 (1975). While these figures are perhaps
the best indication of the numbers of foreign trusts which have been created, they are
only approximate.
Comparable figures for the period prior to 1962 simply do not exist, and it is
necessary to rely on the opinions of practitioners whose impressions have appeared in
print. Several, in the early 1960s, referred to the increasing popularity of foreign situs
trusts at that time. E.g., Altman & Kanter, Current Tax Planning Through Foreign
Situs Trusts, 47 A.B.A.J. 635 (1961); Hammerman, Foreign Situs Trusts-Defining the
Undefined, 38 TAXES 529 (1960). Another wrote that, until 1960, not one trust had been
created by a U.S. grantor for U.S. beneficiaries in either the Bahamas or Bermuda,
two of the most obvious tax havens. Fine, Amazing Tax Advantages of Foreign Trusts
for United States Individuals, TENTH ANNUAL TULANE TAX INSTITUTE 163 (1961). Per-
haps the more realistic approach is to recognize that foreign trusts remained unfamiliar
to all but a highly sophisticated circle of attorneys and that the frequency of their use
was limited accordingly.
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a subject of scholarly commentary than a widespread element
of actual tax planning.' Certainly the costs of creating and
administering such a device must render it inexpedient for all
but the very wealthy.' Lending credence to this notion is the
fact that the anticipated revenue effects of proposals designed
to curtail the use of foreign trusts have always been insignifi-
cant.' On the other hand, the Treasury Department has consis-
tently urged Congress to adopt measures discouraging the use
of foreign trusts, arguing that they provided a vehicle which
permitted a number of wealthy Americans to defer, or even
avoid, their tax obligations. A similar concern has been ex-
pressed from other quarters as well. Testifying before the 1974
House Ways and Means Committee on the Tax Reform Act,
3. See Zimmerman, Foreign Trusts: Their Present and Future Estate Planning
Potential, 31 J. TAX. 258, 260 (1969), which implies that it was this mushrooming
publicity about foreign trusts, rather than the reality of their abuse, which in the past
led the Treasury Department to seek reforms limiting their use.
4. It has also been suggested that even the very wealthy may shy away from
foreign trusts, at least those established in Bermuda, the Bahamas, etc., either because
of the stigma of "tax dodging" associated with these localities, Comment, Foreign
Situs Trusts: The Option of Utilizing a High Taxation Jurisdiction, 52 TEX. L. REv.
949 (1974), or because of a "fear of persecution" by the Internal Revenue Service,
Grundy, The Off-shore Trust, 1971 BRITISH TAX REV. 336, 338 n.8.
5. E.g., Congress has estimated that the grantor trust rules of the 1976 Tax Re-
form Act, arguably the most stringent tax imposed on foreign trusts, will increase
federal revenues only by 10 million dollars annually. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 20 (1975) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 94-658]; S. REP. No. 94-938,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1976) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 94-9381.
6. William E. Simon, former Secretary of the Treasury, testified in a statement
prepared for the Senate hearings on the 1976 Tax Reform Act that, "[tihe House Bill
would end the tax loophole whereby many wealthy individuals avoid U.S. tax through
the creation of foreign trusts." Hearings on H.R. 10612 Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1976).
An even better indication of the attitude of the Treasury Department towards
foreign trusts is provided by a letter from Mr. Fred Hickman, Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury for Tax Policy, to Representative Vanik of the House Ways and Means
Committee. Mr. Hickman stated: "You asked whether the use of foreign trusts by
Americans constitutes a serious problem of tax avoidance. Although the seriousness
of the problem is debatable, it seems likely that in most cases the primary reason why
an American would choose to use a foreign trust rather than a domestic trust is to
reduce or defer U.S. taxes." Shop Talk, 42 J. TAX. 63 (1975).
Finally, several courts have rather cryptically referred to Project Haven, a grand
jury investigation into the use of foreign trusts, with respect to which the "morally
dubious tactics" of the Internal Revenue Service have been challenged on Constitu-
tional grounds. See United States v. Baskes, CCH 1977 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S.
TAX CAS. (77-1, at 86,963) 9393 (N.D. II1. March 23, 1977); United States v. Matthies-
sen, CCH 1977 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAX CAS. (77-1, at 86, 792) 9351 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 11, 1977).
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one practitioner characterized foreign trusts as "among the
most flagrant types of tax abuse that the Committee should be
concerned with in the foreign area." 7
In several instances foreign trusts were designed strictly to
allow beneficiaries or grantors to completely avoid taxation.
For example, a foreign trust would be established in a country
with little or no income tax. Money from the trust would then
be deposited in a foreign bank with a branch office in the
United States. The U.S. beneficiary of the trust would then
apply to the American branch of the foreign bank for a loan in
the same amount as that deposited in the main office. Collat-
eral for the loan would be the money on deposit in the main
office. The U.S. beneficiary would then have free use of what
would ordinarily be taxable income, with the added benefit of
a tax deduction for the interest on the loan. As can be seen, it
was possible to establish a foreign trust the income of which
could be accumulated and eventually distributed to U.S. bene-
ficiaries without subjecting either the trust or its beneficiaries
to an income tax at any time, anywhere in the world.' Although
periodic Congressional efforts at reform succeeded in subduing
some of the most flagrant abuses, those efforts failed to elimi-
nate the lucrative opportunities for tax deferral provided by
foreign trusts.
Congress may have accomplished its goal in the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976. The reforms in the Act directed towards
foreign trusts approach the problem in three significant ways.
First, the Act broadens the scope of the excise tax provisions
to include appreciated property of whatever nature and in-
creases the rate applicable to such transfers to equal the maxi-
mum capital gains rate. Second, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, a new section has been added that treats income earned
by a foreign trust with one or more U.S. beneficiaries as if it
were still owned by those persons who transferred property to
the trust. Third, the Act modifies the so-called throwback
rules, principally by adding an interest charge to the distribu-
tions of foreign trusts. This, then, gives domestic trusts more
favorable treatment than foreign situs trusts.
7. Hearings on Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1934 (1975).
8. H.R. REp. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1962); S. REP. No. 1881, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1962).
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This paper seeks to describe the provisions of the 1976 Tax
Reform Act which alter the tax treatment of foreign trusts and
to appraise their effectiveness in light of stated Congressional
goals. To place these provisions in their proper context, the
paper will first trace legislation designed to accomplish these
ends.
II. ATTRIBUTES OF THE FOREIGN TRUST
For a considerable period of time, foreign trusts gained
increasing popularity in spite of the dangers created by the
failure of Congress, the Treasury Department, and the courts
to identify precisely which criteria characterized a trust as a
foreign entity.? It has always been unquestionably clear that a
trust established by a foreign settlor and administered by a
foreign trustee for the benefit of foreign beneficiaries qualifies
as a foreign trust.'0 However, considerable difficulty arose once
the trust began to acquire limited contacts with the United
States.
In the face of this uncertainty, commentators reached a
general consensus that a trust created in a foreign jurisdiction
and administered there by a foreign trustee would be treated
as a foreign trust for federal tax purposes." Of critical import-
ance was the fact that the fiduciary was a nonresident alien and
that the trust was created under the law of a foreign jurisdic-
tion. While some weight might be given to the place of adminis-
tration and the location of the trust res, these factors were not
9. See generally Altman & Kanter, Current Tax Planning, supra note 2, at 635;
Hammerman, Foreign Situs Trusts, supra note 2, at 533-42; Hammerman, IRS Clari-
fies Foreign Situs Trusts as Bill to End Some Tax Benefits Dies, 13 J. TAX. 199 (1960);
Tovey, Structure and Tax Advantages of Foreign Situs Trusts, 49 GEo. L.J. 697, 699-
707 (1961).
10. Cf. Muir v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 819 (4th Cir. 1950). In a suit by the trustee
for a judicial determination on the apportionment of income between two beneficiaries,
one an alien residing in the United States, the other an English citizen, the Commis-
sioner did not contest the trustee's failure to file federal income tax returns, presuma-
bly on the basis that the trust was a foreign situs trust; here it had been created in
England by an English grantor, administered by an English trustee, and funded by
U.S. securities apparently held in England.
11. See sources cited in note 9 supra.
Congress has defined foreign trusts on the basis of these criteria in a committee
report which accompanied an unsuccessful bill to discourage such trusts; that report
indicated that the proposed amendments would apply to a "trust created by a U.S.
citizen in a foreign country with a non-resident alien as trustee." S. REP. No. 1616,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1960).
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controlling. Moreover, it remains well settled that a foreign
trust may be created by a U.S. grantor for the benefit of U.S.
beneficiaries; in fact, the provisions of the Tax Reform Act,
applicable to "[a] United States person who . . . transfers
property to a foreign trust . . . if there is a U.S. beneficiary,"' 2
compel such a conclusion. Accordingly, the following discus-
sion assumes the definition of a foreign trust to be a trust
created by a U.S. person in a foreign jurisdiction with a nonres-
ident alien as trustee.
III. TAXATION OF THE OPERATING FOREIGN TRUST, ITS GRANTOR,
AND BENEFICIARIES
A. Background and Historical Development
The fundamental premise underlying the entire system of
trust taxation is that the the trust and its beneficiaries are
treated as separate taxable entities.'3 To avoid double taxation,
the Code contains an elaborate set of rules designed to appor-
tion tax liability between the two. In general, the trust is al-
lowed a deduction for distributions made to beneficiaries, who
in turn are required to include those distributions in their gross
income. In simple trusts, where the income is distributed cur-
rently as earned, the trust simply serves as a conduit, channel-
ing all the year's income, together with the entire tax liability,
to the beneficiaries. In all other trusts-complex trusts-the
trustee may retain annual income, pay any tax due, and dis-
tribute the amounts accumulated in later years. In theory, in-
come is taxed to the trust when retained by it, and to the
beneficiaries when distributed.
The measure of the respective tax obligations of the trust
and its beneficiaries depends on distributable net income
(DNI).' 4 Defined as the taxable income of the trust, subject to
various adjustments,'" DNI establishes the maximum amount
which the trust may take as an annual deduction.'" When an
annual distribution falls short of DNI, the trust pays the tax
on the undistributed portion; the sum of that tax and the un-
12. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1013 (a), adding INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 679(a)(1).
13. Much of the following summary is based on H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 92 (1969).
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 643(a).
15. Id.; the most significant of these adjustments is that taxable income is com-
puted without regard to the deduction allowed for distributions to beneficiaries.
16. Id. §§ 651(b), 661(a).
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distributed income are termed "undistributed net income."' 7
Any distribution in excess of DNI is treated as an accumulation
distribution and is taxed to the beneficiaries under the throw-
back rules.
Clearly, when current income accumulates in the trust,
substantial benefits may be achieved under the progressive
rate structure whenever the rate applicable to the trust is less
than that of the beneficiaries. Accordingly, the Code has al-
ways contained provisions to vitiate these income-splitting pos-
sibilities by taxing beneficiaries on accumulated income dis-
tributed to them in substantially the same manner as though
they had received it in the same year the income was earned
by the trust. Every distribution in excess of DNI is treated as
consisting of undistributed net income accumulated in prior
years. 8 When "thrown back," the accumulation distribution is
deemed to have been received by the taxpayer in those prior
years in which the trust retained undistributed net income."
The peculiar advantages which have in the past attached
to foreign trusts resulted from the combined applications of the
above described principles of trust taxation and the rules set-
ting forth the tax treatment of foreign entities. For just as
trusts generally are taxed as individuals, 2 foreign trusts are
treated as nonresident aliens.2 ' In addition to the income-
splitting and tax deferral benefits available under all trusts, a
foreign trust accumulating income could escape paying U.S.
income tax or, for that matter, any income tax whatsoever.
A nonresident alien individual engaged in trade or busi-
ness within the United States is taxed at section 1 rates only
on that income which is effectively connected with the conduct
of a trade or business within the United States.2 Pursuant to
the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966,2 it is even possible for
17. Id. § 665(a).
18. Id. § 666(a).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 641(b).
21. See Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(a) (1977); Hearings on the Tax Recommendations
of the President Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
271 (1961). Compare INT. RED. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(31) with INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 872(a).
22. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 871(b).
23. Pub. L. No. 89-809, tit. I, 80 Stat. 1539 (1966) (codified in scattered sections
of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954).
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a foreign trustee to trade in domestic stocks or securities
through a resident broker, custodian, or agent, for such conduct
is excluded from the definition of "trade or business within the
United States."24 The exclusion will still be available if the
principal, i.e., the trustee, maintains an office or fixed place of
business within the United States," but doing so will likely
destroy the trust's status as a nonresident alien.
26
Otherwise, the Code imposes a tax of 30 percent, or lower
treaty rate if applicable, upon the fixed or determinable in-
come, such as rents, interest, dividends, and the like, of a non-
resident alien individual who is not engaged in a trade or busi-
ness within the United States." The tax is withheld at the
source, and the responsibility for its payment lies with the
person having the control, receipt, custody, disposal, or pay-
ment of the income. 2s No tax at all is placed upon the capital
gains realized by the foreign trust within the United States,
provided that the trust is not deemed to have been present in
the country for 183 days or more during the taxable year.
29
Finally, a foreign trust is not required to pay any U.S.
taxes on income derived from sources outside the United
States.30 Thus the trust itself will incur U.S. taxes only to the
extent that it earns ordinary income from sources within the
United States, assuming it is not present in the country for
more than 183 days.
In practice, the foreign trust, more likely than not, paid no
income tax, either to the United States or to any other taxing
jurisdiction. In other words, if the foreign trust were estab-
lished in a country with little or no income tax, and if it limited
its investments in such a manner that the income would not
be taxable either by the United States or by the country of its
source, then that trust would offer a lucrative method of accu-
mulating and compounding tax-free income. Moreover, while
the use of foreign trusts thus permitted the shifting of income
24. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 864(b)(2).
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 864(c) bars the exclusion where the taxpayer is
trading in securities, but not where the taxpayer is trading for his own account.
26. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
27. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 871(a)(1).
28. Id. § 1441(a).
29. Id. § 871(a)(2).
30. See id. § 871(a).
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to a nontaxable entity, the structure of the throwback rules
under the original version of the 1954 Code sanctioned not just
the postponement of taxation, but rather its avoidance alto-
gether, once the accumulated income was distributed to the
beneficiaries.
As originally enacted, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
limited the amount of the taxable accumulation distribution."
Thus, if a foreign trust minimized its undistributed net income
in the five years preceeding a distribution of accumulated earn-
ings, or at least if it made investments the income from which
would not be included in DNI, the beneficiaries were not taxed
on the distribution.32 Apart from this exemption, the Code also
contained numerous exceptions to the original throwback
rules.3 Perhaps the most expansive was an exclusion from the
definition of a taxable accumulation distribution of all
amounts paid to beneficiaries in a final distribution nine years
after the date of the last transfer to the trust. 4 If properly
created, trusts funded in successive years could, under this
exception, assure the beneficiaries of an annual income which
was not subject to taxation in their hands.
Not surprisingly, the preferential tax status of foreign
trusts, arising by virtue of their existence outside the reach of
the U.S. taxing authority and also by virtue of the inadequacy
of the throwback rules, stirred concern both in Congress and in
the Treasury Department. In the Trust and Partnership In-
come Tax Revision Bill of 1960,11 the Senate Finance Commit-
tee proposed amendments to the Code which would have elimi-
nated the application of the exceptions to the throwback rules
with respect to foreign trusts, and which would have broadened
the categories of foreign trust income subject to the new, ex-
31. Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 224 (1954) (current version at INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 666(a)).
32. Altman & Kanter, Current Tax Planning, supra note 2, at 639; Altman &
Kanter, Senate Finance Committee Looks at Foreign Situs Trusts, 38 TAXES 585, 592
(1960).
33. Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 223 (1954) (current version at INT. Rev. CODE
OF 1954, § 665(b)).
34. Id. (formerly codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 665(b)).
35. H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); see S. REP. No. 1616, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 26, 60 (1960). Although the bill was reported out of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee, it failed to gain passage prior to adjournment.
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panded throwback rules.36 Significantly, the proposed mea-
sures would not have taxed income accumulated earlier than
the five years preceeding distribution. 7
The abortive Senate Finance Committee proposals clearly
charted the direction for future reform. In the following year,
the Kennedy Administration urged the revival of the Finance
Committee measures with respect to foreign trusts then exist-
ing. As for trusts created in the future, the Administration
advocated, rather presciently, that their income be taxed cur-
rently to the grantor.3 Then, in the Revenue Act of 1962, the
87th Congress succeeded in enacting the first significant re-
forms applicable to foreign trusts .
3
The 1962 amendments affected the taxation of foreign
trusts in several important ways. First, the Act repealed the
five year limitation to the throwback rules, as well as all other
exceptions, with respect to foreign, but not domestic trusts.'
Placed in a less advantageous position than the beneficiaries
of domestic trusts, beneficiaries of foreign trusts could no
longer escape taxation on accumulated earnings eventually dis-
tributed to them.
41
Secondly, the 1962 reforms expanded the applicability of
the throwback rules by broadening the definition of a foreign
trust's distributable net income. 4 Formerly, the DNI of a for-
eign trust had included, in addition to those items of income
computed in the DNI of a domestic trust, net foreign income.
43
Because neither capital gains nor income exempt from U.S. tax
by treaty were required to be included in the distributable net
income of a trust, they were not in the calculation of undis-
36. See Altman & Kanter, Senate Finance Committee, supra note 32, at 586, 651-
54.
37. Id. at 654.
38. Hearings on the Tax Recommendations of the President Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 272 (1961).
39. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 7, 76 Stat. 985.
40. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 7(b), 76 Stat. 985 (formerly codi-
fied at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 99 666(a), 665(c), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 331(a), 83 Stat. 592).
41. See Zimmerman, supra note 3, at 258.
42. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 7(a)(1), 76 Stat. 985 (current
version codified at INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 643(a)(6), as amended by 1976 Tax
Reform Act, § 1013(c)).
43. Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 217 (1954) (current version codified at Mcr. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 643).
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tributed net income, to which the throwback rules applied.
4
By redefining DNI to embrace those items of income,45 the
1962 Act equalized the treatment of foreign and domestic
trusts.
Finally, the Act for the first time required the grantor or
transferor of a foreign trust to file an information return. Fail-
ure to file the return entailed a substantial penalty.47 It is diffi-
cult to ascertain whether the information submitted on these
returns has proven valuable for the purposee of drafting reme-
dial legislation; it has, however, been suggested that that infor-
mation is not sufficient to enable the Internal Revenue Service
to detect serious abuses of the foreign trust provisions."
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 contained provisions which
broadly restricted the usefulness of domestic trusts, at the
same time indirectly enhancing the relative attractiveness of
foreign trusts. Seeking to accord foreign and domestic trusts
identical treatment,49 Congress abolished all the throwback
rule exceptions with respect to domestic trusts .5 The effect of
this amendment was to restrict the utility of all trusts, foreign
and domestic, to tax deferral, rather than tax avoidance. None-
theless, since the foreign trust usually paid no income taxes
during the period of accumulation, the deferral benefits avail-
able to the foreign trust were relatively enhanced. While the
domestic trustee paid tax annually on its undistributed in-
come, such income accumulated tax-free in the foreign trust.
A second advantage accruing to the beneficiaries of foreign
trusts arose as a result of a revision of the rules relating to
capital gains. Pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1962, the capital
gains of a foreign trust were included in its distributable net
income, and each distribution to the beneficiaries was deemed
to be proportionally composed of capital gains. Under the 1969
44. Id.
45. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 7(a)(1), 76 Stat. 985.
46. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6048.
47. Id. § 6677(a).
48. New York State Bar Ass'n, Report on Foreign Trusts, 31 TAX L. REV. 265, 270
(1976).
49. See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 94 (1969); S. REP.
No. 91-552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 127 (1969).
50. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 331(a), 83 Stat. 592, amending
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 223 (current version codified at
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 665(b), 666(a)).
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Act, however, the capital gains of domestic trusts were treated
separately from ordinary income. 5' As a consequence, amounts
distributed to the beneficiaries of a domestic trust were taxed
as ordinary income until all the ordinary income accumulated
throughout the existence of the trust had been exhausted."2 In
contrast, the beneficiary of a foreign trust could take advantage
of the preferential capital gains rates in each distribution,
without waiting first for all ordinary income to be exhausted.
53
On the eve of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, foreign trusts
appeared to provide a superior means of compounding income
realized in tax-free investments. Also, taxpayers had achieved
considerable savings by structuring complicated transactions,
the linchpin of which was one or more foreign trusts. It is in
light of these unintended statutory preferences granted to for-
eign trusts over domestic trusts, as well as the succession of
unsuccessful legislative efforts to eliminate those preferences,
that the provisions of the 1976 Tax Reform Act must be exam-
ined.
B. Changes under the Tax Reform Act of 1976
In many ways, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 represents a
departure from past Congressional attempts to regulate foreign
trusts. In prior years, Congress sought to vitiate the effects of
tax deferral through a fine tuning of the throwback rules. Now,
the principal approach of the Act is to attribute all ownership
of the trust to those persons who fund it, requiring them to pay
a current, rather than a postponed, tax on the trust's annual
income. As a "safety net" provision, the Act also imposes an
interest charge upon accumulation distribution taxes, when-
ever the grantor trust rules are inapplicable.
1. Grantor Trust Rules
By 1974, when the proposed amendments relating to for-
eign trusts were first considered by Congress,54 the House Ways
51. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 331(a), 83 Stat. 596 (formerly
codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 669), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 701(d).
52. Id.
53. See generally Dale, Foreign Trust Now Offer Particular Estate Planning
Advantages, 36 J. TAX. 20, 21 (1972).
54. Originally, these amendments were introduced as sections 312-14 of the En-
ergy Tax and Individual Relief Act of 1974, H.R. 17488, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),
which failed to gain passage prior to the adjournment of the 93d Congress. For a
summary of the provisons of this bill, see H.R. REP. No. 93-1502, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
120 (1974).
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and Means Committee had already identified what it felt to be
the single greatest deficiency of the foreign trust provisions of
the Code. The Committee clearly recognized that the likeli-
hood that a foreign trust might accumulate income free from
any tax whatsoever represented "an unwarranted advantage to
the use of a foreign trust over the use of a domestic trust."5
To remedy this defect, the 1976 Tax Reform Act adds a
new section especially tailored to foreign trusts, section 679.56
Section 679 provides that any U.S. person who directly or indi-
rectly transfers property to a foreign trust shall be treated as
the owner of that portion of the trust which is attributable to
such transferred property, if there is a U.S. beneficiary of any
portion of the trust. While the scope of this general rule is
extended by various accompanying attribution rules, the legis-
lative history reveals an intent that its applicability be even
broader than may be apparent from the face of the statute.
Several specific exceptions, however, may enable tax and es-
tate planners to employ foreign trusts under limited circum-
stances in the future.
Of the two prerequisites to the applicability of the rule,
only the question of the existence of a U.S. beneficiary is
treated by the Act in any detail; the other requirement, that
there be a U.S. transferor, is clarified only in the Committee
reports and will be discussed below. In general, a trust is
treated as having a U.S. beneficiary unless the terms of the
trust agreement satisfy both of two conditions. First, during the
taxable year, no part of the income or corpus may be paid to
or accumulated for the benefit of a U.S. person;57 and second,
if the trust were to terminate at any time during the taxable
year, no part of the income or corpus may be paid to or for the
benefit of a United States person."
A new set of attribution rules establishes when the income
or corpus of a foreign trust is paid to or accumulated for the
55. H.R. REP. No. 93-1502, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 121, 122 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 94-
658, at 207.
56. 1976 Tax Reform act, § 1013(a), adding INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 679(a)(1).
57. "U.S. person" is defined by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(30) to include
any citizen or resident of the United States, domestic partnership, domestic corpora-
tion, or estate or trust other than a foreign estate or trust within the meaning of INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(31).
58. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1013(a), adding INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 679(c)(1).
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benefit of a U.S. person. A foreign entity will be deemed to be
a U.S. beneficiary if: (1) it is a foreign corporation, of which
more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock is owned by United States shareholders; (2) it
is a foreign partnership, of which a U.S. person is a partner; or
(3) it is a foreign trust or estate which has a U.S. beneficiary. 9
In any taxable year in which a trust, which would have
otherwise been subject to section 679 in the immediately pre-
ceeding taxable year but for the lack of a U.S. beneficiary,
actually acquires a U.S. beneficiary, the United States trans-
feror is then treated as the owner of the trust. The transferor
will thus be required to include in his gross income for the year
in which the trust acquires a U.S. beneficary all the undistri-
buted net income retained by the trust as of the close of the
immediately preceeding taxable year, to the extent that such
undistributed net income is attributable to property trans-
ferred to the trust by the transferor. 0
The Committee reports indicate that these requirements
can be met only if the trust instrument (which is to be read to
include any related written or oral agreements between the
trustee and the transferor) specifically names all permissible
beneficiaries, no one of whom is a U.S. person, or if it describes
all beneficiaries as a class of unnamed persons which specifi-
cally excludes all U.S. persons." In other words, the trust may
be treated as a grantor trust if any person, whether or not
adverse to the grantor, possesses the power to appoint U.S.
beneficiaries or even to so amend the trust agreement in such
a way that the trustee might be authorized to distribute corpus
or income to a class which could conceivably include a U.S.
person.2 If a foreign trust does not have a U.S. beneficiary, it
will, nonetheless, fall under the reach of section 679 should any
of its beneficiaries become a U.S. person. 3
The liability created by section 679 is imposed on any U.S.
person who transfers property to a foreign trust which has or
acquires a U.S. beneficiary, regardless of whether such a trans-
59. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1013(a), adding INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 679(c)(2).
60. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1013(a), adding INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 679(b).
61. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 210; S. REP. No. 94-938, at 219.
62. Id.
63. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 210 n.12.
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fer is made directly or indirectly. If a U.S. person possesses
sufficient control over a domestic or foreign entity to cause that
entity to make a transfer to a foreign trust or if the entity
merely serves as a conduit for such a transfer by a U.S. person,
then the U.S. person will be considered to have made an indi-
rect transfer." For example, a foreign trust funded by a domes-
tic corporation in which a U.S. person has a controlling interest
may be regarded as owned by the shareholder. Also, Congress
apparently expects the term "indirect transfer" to encompass
loans to the trust, whether made by any U.S. person or merely
guaranteed by him, regardless of the formality or informality
of the guarantee. 5
The general rule of section 679(a) applies equally to trans-
fers that are donative as well as to sales or exchanges. 6 The
Act, however, does except sales or exchanges that are made of
property transferred at its fair market value in a transaction in
which the transferor realizes all gain at that time and recog-
nizes it either at the time or under an installment method of
reporting. "7 This exception was designed to protect parties in
ordinary business transactions, who transfer property to the
trust in return for full and adequate cash consideration or in-
stallment payments, and who otherwise risk being treated as a
partial owner of the trust assets. However, the exception is not
broad enough to cover transfers in return for a private annuity
or other "open transactions."
A U.S. person is regarded as the owner of a foreign trust
only during his lifetime. Section 679 is not applicable to trans-
fers to foreign trusts which take effect by reason of the death
of the transferor.70 Thus, the estate of a U.S. individual would
not be taxed on the income of a foreign testamentary trust.7'
64. Id. at 209.
65. Id. at 209 n.9.
66. Id. at 210.
67. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1013(a), adding INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 679(a)(2).
A transaction reported on an installment basis, however, will be subject to the section
1491 excise tax. See text accompanying notes 107-51 infra.
68. See Lerner, US.A.: Legislative Proposals Affecting the Taxation of Foreign
Trusts, 75-3 TAx MANAGEMENT-INT'L J. 10. 13 (1975).
69. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 210.
70. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1013(a), adding INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 679
(a)(2)(A).
71. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 209.
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Whether or not the foreign trust would be included in the gross
estate of the settlor of an inter vivos trust would depend on the
applicability of the estate tax provisions." Therefore, all the
advantages that were available by using a foreign trust prior to
the 1976 Tax Reform Act are still within reach of the testamen-
tary trust.
To facilitate the implementation of section 679, changes
have been made in two other sections. Section 6048 has been
amended to make it the responsibility of the grantor to file a
trust information return. The information to be required has
not yet been prescribed but will be provided at a later date by
regulations. Failure to file such a return is covered by amend-
ments to section 6677(a). In addition to any criminal penalty,
a person failing to file such information is subject to a penalty
equal to 5 percent of the entire trust corpus (not just the value
of property transferred to the trust by the grantor) or $1,000,
whichever is less.
It must be noted that the Tax Reform Act of 1976 makes
many of these changes retroactive. Section 679 and the amend-
ments to sections 6048 and 6677 apply to taxable years ending
after December 31, 1975 (which encompasses taxable years
beginning as early as February 1, 1975). This is, however, only
in respect to trusts created or transfers made after May 21,
1974.
Any appraisal of the new grantor trust rules must begin by
recognizing that, while they may be consistent analytically
with the principles of federal income taxation, they seem to
exceed what has customarily been the jurisdictional limit of the
taxing power of the United States.
While the contours of those rules of international law
which limit the extent of a country's tax jurisdiction have never
been defined with any clarity, it would seem that Congress does
not have the power to tax a foreign trust directly. One authority
states the relevant general principles of international law as
follows:
states have authority, as an incident of sovereignty, to tax aliens
resident within their territory and their property there situated.
In theory, states are presumed to limit the taxation of non-
resident aliens to their property situated within the jurisdiction
of the taxing states and to income derived from sources therein.7 3
Whether or not these principles are mandatory or merely per-
72. Id.
73. 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 575 (1942).
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suasive, U.S. practice has demonstrated compliance in the
past.74 In fact, foreign trusts, according to the definition set
forth in the Code, are entities "the income of which, from
sources outside the United States which is not effectively
connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the
United States, is not includable in gross income. . .. " It
should be clear that the United States is justified in taxing
currently the income of a foreign trust only by virtue of the
artificial attribution of its ownership to a U.S. grantor.
Even this justification fails in view of its departure from
the premises underlying grantor trust taxation. Traditionally,
the Code has denied a grantor the opportunity to shift tax
liability to a trust where the grantor has retained certain inci-
dents of ownership, such as a power to revoke or a right to
receive income. Preserving the practical effect, but not the ra-
tionale of the grantor trust rules, section 679 adds an entirely
new criterion, the residence of the trust and its beneficiaries,
qne which bears virtually no relation to the queston of actual
ownership. It is, in other words, all too possible for the grantor
to convey all rights and interest in the trust, both legal and
equitable, present and future, and yet still be treated as the
absolute owner pursuant to the highly contrived and anoma-
lous fiction created by section 679. Such a result might be
achieved simply because of the random migrations of a benefi-
ciary, factors over which the grantor can have little or no con-
trol.7" The artificial attribution of ownership of the foreign trust
should not be used to disguise what is in fact an expansion of
Congress's traditional and customary power to tax nonresident
aliens.
Further criticism of section 679 might be directed at its
unfairness and its inadequacy. First, as implied above, the
grantor is taxed on all the trust's income, whether accumulated
or distributed. This appears to be true even where the income
is paid and taxed currently to the beneficiaries, since there are
no provisions permitting the beneficiary to credit taxes paid by
74. Cf. text accompanying notes 23-30 supra.
75. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(31).
76. Of course, the grantor may draft provisions terminating the trust or at least
the migrant beneficiary's interest, taking care not to subject himself to any of the other
grantor trust pitfalls. This remedy is not, it should be noted, available to the transferor
who was not the settlor.
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the grantor. This increase in the grantor's tax liability will
carry through on a state and municipal level, since many juris-
dictions calculate state and local income taxes on the basis of
federal adjusted gross income.
Finally, as broadly as Congress intended section 679 to be
interpreted, its potential application remains in question. The
Act states that the transferor will be taxed on direct or indirect
transfers to a foreign trust," and the legislative history de-
scribes in remarkably sweeping terms what should be consid-
ered an indirect transfer."8 It seems likely that the Service will
construe this portion of the section in as broad a manner as
possible. Nonetheless, the statutory language does not foreclose
the possibility of circuitous transactions which might circum-
vent the purposes of the section. For example, it is now unclear
whether a trust whose governing instrument specifically pre-
cludes distributions to U.S. beneficiaries might nonetheless
make payments to a nonresident alien, perhaps to a foreign
bank, thereby permitting a U.S. person to obtain a loan from
the bank's domestic branch office secured by the deposit over-
seas. Section 665(c) of the Code initially seems to prohibit such
a transaction, for that section states as follows:
For purposes of this subpart, any amount paid to a United States
person which is from a payor who is not a United States person
and which is derived directly or indirectly from a foreign trust
created by a United States person shall be deemed in the year of
payment to have been directly paid by the foreign trust.
However, the subpart in which section 665(c) is codified is
subpart D. The new grantor trust rules, section 679, are in
subpart E.
Congress has indicated that a deposit in a bank which
loans or has loaned money to a foreign trust will be treated as
a transfer to the foreign trust. 9 Litigation may be required to
determine whether a similarly circuitous transaction in reverse
might be deemed a direct distribution to a U.S. beneficiary.
2. Taxation of Beneficiaries
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 makes several changes with
respect to the treatment of accumulation distributions to bene-
77. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1013(a), adding hr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 679(a)(1).
78. See H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 208-10.
79. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 209 n.9.
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ficiaries of foreign trusts. Three of those changes could be
highly significant. The changes involve a change in the charac-
terization of all gross income items on their distribution by a
foreign trust, a major revision of the throwback rules, and a
nondeductible interest charge imposed on distributions where
the grantor is not taxed.
Prior to the Act, foreign trusts created by United States
persons were required to aggregate both capital gains and ordi-
nary income in the calculation of DNI. The rule now extends
to all foreign trusts, including those created by nonresident
aliens.'* The Tax Reform Act now converts the character of any
undistributed capital gains included in the distributed net in-
come into ordinary income."' The Committee reports indicate
that the effect of this amendment will be to treat all distribu-
tions from a foreign trust as ordinary income and to deny the
benefit of the 50 percent deduction of net long term capital
gains to both the trust and the beneficiaries. 2 The trust may,
however, take into account the section 1202 deduction when
computing the undistributed net income of the trust accumu-
lated during each taxable year beginning on or before Decem-
ber 31, 1975 and distributed after that date.8 3 For all income
earned after that date, the Act does not permit the capital
gains deduction. 4
The Act has made some major changes in Code sections
665 through 669, the so-called "throwback" rules. These
changes are applicable to domestic and foreign trusts alike. Of
particular significance is the change in the method of comput-
ing the tax payable on an accumulation distribution. Pre-
viously, the taxpayer could elect to use an "exact" method in
such a computation. The Act eliminates the "exact" method
and modifies its former alternative, the "shortcut" method. 5
Briefly, the total tax paid by a beneficiary consists of the sum
of a partial tax computed on his total taxable income reduced
80. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 668.
81. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1013(c), amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 643
(a)(6)(C); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 213.
82. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 213.
83. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1013(c)(2), adding INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 643
(a)(6)(D).
84. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 213.
85. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 701(a)(1), amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 667(a).
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by all those amounts to which the throwback rules apply plus
the tax computed under the "shortcut" method."
The shortcut computation is made as follows. First, the
taxpayer examines his taxable income for the five years pre-
ceeding the accumulation distribution, discarding both the
year when his taxable income was the highest and the year
when it was lowest. Next, the taxpayer adds on to his taxable
income for each of the three remaining years an amount equal
to the average annual distribution, that is, the total amount of
the accumulation distribution divided by the number of years
on the last day of which the trust was deemed to have had
undistributed net income of which the accumulation distribu-
tion is composed. Then the taxpayer recomputes his tax for
those three years on the basis of this increased, recalculated
taxable income. The increase of his taxes so calculated over the
taxes actually paid is then averaged over the three years. Fi-
nally, the taxpayer multiplies that average increase in taxes
times the number of years on the last day of which the trust
was deemed to have had undistributed net income. This final
product is compared with the amount of taxes paid by the
trustee and deemed distributed to the beneficiary under sec-
tion 666(b) and (c). The excess, if any, is the tax payable by
the beneficiary.
8 7
Under Code section 668, the beneficiary of a foreign trust
must now pay a nondeductible simple interest charge on the
tax computed from the year in which the income distributed
was first accumulated. This charge is in addition to any taxes
that would be due on the distribution but is assessed only in
the event that the grantor trust rules are inapplicable."' The
computation of interest charge is made by multiplying an
amount equal to six percent of the partial tax computed under
Code section 667(b) by a fraction (the number of taxable years
between each taxable year to which distribution is allocated
under Code section 666(a) and the taxable year of distribution
over the number of taxable years to which the distribution is
allocated under Code section 666(a)). 89
86. Id.
87. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 701(a), amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 667(b).
88. An example would be if a trust were funded by a testamentary transfer or by
a nonresident alien settlor.
89. See text accompanying note 87 supra; the House Committee Report sets out
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The total amount to be charged under Code section 668 is
limited to the amount of accumulation distribution. 0 This
limit is computed by adding the interest charge to the partial
tax derived by Code section 667(b).
The interest charge computed under this section will be
applicable to any undistributed net income existing in a trust
as of January 1, 1977. This will be treated as if it were allocated
under Code section 666(a) to the first taxable year beginning
after December 31, 1976.11
IV. TAXATION OF TRANSFERS TO THE TRUST
A. Estate and Gift Taxes
One must recognize that the transfer to the foreign trust
itself may invoke tax consequences. Accordingly, it is impera-
tive that the draftsman devote careful attention to estate and
gift tax considerations.2 For it is not inconceivable that a for-
eign trust created with a view towards minimizing the income
tax on its earnings could expose the grantor to a gift tax as well
as bring the transferred property into his gross estate for inheri-
tance tax purposes, drastically reducing the benefits otherwise
obtained from the trust.
the following illustrative computation:
[I]f amounts distributed in year 8 were earned in years 2, 3, and 4, the
number of years for which interest is charged is determined first by calcu-
lating the number of years of accumulation for each year in which
amounts distributed were originally earned (in this case 8-2 or 6 years for
amounts earned in year 2, 8-3 or 5 years for amounts earned in year 3,
and 8-4 or 4 years for amounts earned in year 4). The total of these
number of years of accumulation (here 6+5+4, or 15 years) is then div-
ided by the number of different years from which the amounts distributed
were earned (3 different years). The result (5 years) is the average number
of years of accumulation and is multiplied by the 6 percent interest rate
to produce the total percentage of interest (30 percent) which is applied
against the amount of the tax.
H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 212 n.16.
90. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1014(b), amending INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 668
(c)(1).
91. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1014(b), amending er. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 668.
92. To the extent that a U.S. citizen transfers property for less than full and
adequate consideration, the Code imposes a gift tax on that part of the transfer which
is gratuitous and not exempt. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2501. The gift tax rules apply
whether the interests transfered are legal or equitable, present or future. See Treas.
Reg. § 25.2511-1 (1977). Thus the settlor of a foreign trust will become subject to the
gift tax whenever he creates a beneficial interest in someone other than himself. Simi-
larly, an estate tax will be imposed upon a testamentary transfer to a foreign trust.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2033.
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B. Interest Equalization Tax
Seeking to restrain the sale of foreign securitites to U.S.
investors and thus to reduce what it then perceived as a bal-
looning balance of payments problem,9 3 Congress passed the
Interest Equalization Act of 1964.11 That Act imposed a tax of
15 percent on the value of stock issued by a foreign issuer and
acquired by a U.S. person and instituted a graduated tax on
debt securities of foreign obligors. 5 Although foreign trusts did
not fall within the meaning of a "United States person" as that
term was defined by the Act," the concept of "acquisition" was
expanded by Congress to include transfers to such a trust for
the purposes of purchasing securities for the benefit of a U.S.
transferor. 7 In other words, any U.S. person who conveyed
money or property to a foreign trust without receiving full and
adequate consideration was treated as having made a taxable
acquisition of foreign securities to the extent the trust did in
fact acquire such securities.
The lack of any reporting requirements in connection with
the Act hampered the Internal Revenue Service in its enforce-
ment of the foreign trust provisions.9 To remedy this, Congress
in 1969 created a presumption that the foreign trust acquired
securities encompassed by the Act if a U.S. person simply
93. H.R. REP. No. 88-1046, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); S. REP. No. 88-1267, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess.(1964).
94. Act of Sept. 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-563, 78 Stat. 809. The Act was repealed
by the 1976 Tax Reform Act.
95. Id. § 2(a) (formerly codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4911(a), (b)).
96. Id. (formerly codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4920(a)(4)); cf. Rev. Rul.
66-281, 1966-2 CuM. BuLL. 483 ("U.S. Person" does not include a trust where a nonresi-
dent alien is treated as the owner of the entire trust.).
97. Id. (formerly codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4912(b)(1)). Within the
context of § 4912(b)(1)(A), loans were not considered to be adequate consideration
(i.e., sales or exchanges), and thus the lender was deemed to have made a taxable
acquisition. King v. United States, 545 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'g In re King, 424
F. Supp. 117 (D. Colo. 1975); see also H.R. REP. No. 1046, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 27
(1964).
98. See generally Dale, supra note 53, at 21. It bears noting that these provisions
did not altogether encourage investment by the foreign trustee in domestic securities,
inasmuch as the income from domestic sources was subject to a 30 percent (or lower
treaty rate) tax that was withheld at the source. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 871(a)(1).
In contrast, the income derived from foreign securities was not taxed to the trust at
all and was taxed to the beneficiaries only upon its eventual distribution. Id. §§ 872,
661(a), 662(a). See Kroll, Foreign Trusts: Advantages and Problems, 112 TRUSTS AND
ESTATES 618, 620 (1973).
99. See S. RPp. No. 91-928, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1969).
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transferred property to the trust.'0° Only by filing prescribed
quarterly statements' evidencing that the trust had not in fact
acquired any taxable securities could the transferor rebut the
presumption.0 2 Clearly, this burden was placed on the tax-
payer in order to relieve administrative difficulties involved.,"'
These amendments further granted the President author-
ity to raise or lower the tax rates in order to achieve an optimal
balance of payments.04 By Executive Order, the rates were
lowered to zero for all acquisitions made after January 29,
1974.105 The 1976 Tax Reform Act repealed the Interest Equali-
zation Tax with respect to all acquisitions made after June 30,
1974.101
C. Tax on Transfers to Avoid Income Tax
In 1932 Congress recognized the possibility that a U.S.
individual could transfer appreciated securities to a foreign
corporation or trust and escape payment of a capital gains
tax.'0 While the corporation or trust could sell the securities
and realize the gain outside the tax jurisdiction of the United
States, the original transferor, assuming him to be a controlling
shareholder or a beneficial owner, would have lost neither con-
trol over nor benefits from the sale. 01 To discourage such avoid-
ance of the capital gains tax, which was then imposed at a
maximum rate of 25 percent, Congress included in the Revenue
Bill of 1932 provisons for an excise tax of 27 1/2 percent on
transfers of this nature. 00 The tax did not apply if the Commis-
sioner were satisfied that the transfer was not carried out for
the purpose of avoiding federal income taxes."0
100. Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-128,
§ 4(a)(1), 83 Stat. 261, (formerly codified at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4912(b)(1)(B)).
101. Act of Sept. 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-563, § 3, 78 Stat. 809 (formerly codified
at Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6011(d)(1)). The quarterly returns were filed on Form 3780.
Tress. Reg. § 147.8-1(c)(1) (1965).
102. Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-128,
§ 4(a)(1), 83 Stat. 261.
103. See Dale, supra note 53, at 21.
104. Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-128, § 3(a),
83 Stat. 261.
105. Exec. Order No. 11,766, 3A C.F.R. § 127 (1974).
106. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1904(a)(21).
107. H.R. REp. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 51-52 (1932).
108. Id.
109. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 901, 47 Stat. 284 (current version codified at
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1491-94).
110. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1492(2).
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This excise tax remained in the Code as sections 1491 et
seq., substantially unchanged until the Tax Reform Act of
1976. On the whole, the tax had not proven too burdensome,
since it merely compelled the prospective settlor to fund a for-
eign trust with some asset other than appreciated securities. In
certain situations, however, United States grantors have found
it highly desirable to transfer securities rather than unappre-
ciated assets of another character."'
Often, the owners of highly appreciated stock, desirous of
preserving voting rights or simply maintaining a successful in-
vestment, were understandably reluctant to sell their shares,
pay the lower capital gains tax, and fund a trust with the
remaining proceeds. As a result, resourceful practitioners de-
vised ingenious schemes to circumvent, or at least postpone the
incidence of, both the excise and capital gains taxes. For exam-
ple, the settlor might have secured a loan with his appreciated
securities and contributed the borrowed money to the trust."'
The interest was deductible to a limit,"3 and the taxpayer
could conceivably repay the loan with the trust's accumulated
earnings once distributed to him." '
A far more common method of escaping the excise tax was
to sell appreciated securities to a foreign trust in exchange for
a private annuity." 5 Prior to 1976, section 1491 expressly ap-
plied only to the excess of the fair market value of transferred
stock over its adjusted basis in the hands of the transferor." 6
Arguably, the tax could have been imposed on this excess re-
111. For example, commentators have suggested utilizing foreign trusts as a de-
vice for cleansing "tainted" items, such as section 1298 stock, the sale of which would
otherwise produce ordinary income. By using the foreign trust, stock of such nature
could have been converted into capital gains. See Kroll, supra note 98, at 621, 647.
112. See Tovey, supra note 9, at 709-10.
113. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163(d), as amended by 1976 Tax Reform Act,
§ 209(a)(1). The deduction for an individual is limited to $10,000 plus the amount of
net investment income.
114. See Tovey, supra note 9, at 710 & n.50.
115. See generally Kanter, The Foreign Trust-A "One World" Concept of Tax
Planning, U. So. CAL. 1970 TAX INST. 467, 502; Kanter, Recent Tax Court Decisions
Shed Further Light on Private Annuity Transactions, 42 J. TAX. 66 (1975); Kanter,
New Decisions Delineate Tests for Foreign Situs Trusts-Private Annuity
Transactions, 38 J. TAx. 82 (1973); Kassoy, The Private Annuity and the Foreign Situs
Trust, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 86 (1968).
116. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1491, as amended by 1976 Tax Reform Act,
§ 1015(a).
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gardless of whether the transferor received the full fair market
value of his securities in the transaction-thus realizing all
gains at that time-or whether the transfer might have been
merely donative. However, it was fairly well settled that the
section 1491 tax applied only to gratuitous transfers."7 The
Internal Revenue Service apparently accepted the argument
that section 1491 was not intended to penalize transferors by
imposing an excise tax in addition to capital gains taxes. These
taxes were to be imposed in the alternative, and section 1491
applied only to that portion of a transfer which was not made
for full and adequate consideration.' 8
Normally the fair market value of the transferred securi-
ties was used to establish the present value of the annuity
purchased by the transferor in the exchange." ' The excess of
present value, equal to the fair market value of the securities,
over their adjusted basis in the hands of the transferor became
gain realized by the transferor/annuitant.120 But, while the
transfer was considered to be a completed transaction for the
purposes of avoiding the application of section 1491, it was not
a taxable event in the sense that the taxpayer had to report all
his gain at the time of the sale. Rather, he was deemed to
receive in each payment a pro rata mixture of part nontaxable
return of capital, part interest, and part capital gains.'2 ' The
117. This is at least the assumption on which Congress proceeded when consider-
ing the provisons in the 1976 Tax Reform Act which would have eliminated this
possibility. See H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 213; S. REP. No. 94-938, at 223.
118. See Kanter & Horwood, Section 1491 Tax and Private Annuity/Foreign Situs
Trust Transaction, 52 TAXEs 388 (1974).
It should be noted, however, that where the transfer to the foreign trust is made
without adequate consideration, a gift tax and the section 1491 tax may be imposed,
and the trustee's basis will be the same as the basis in the hands of the transferor.
Thus, while the sale by the trustee of the appreciated securities will not subject the
trustee to payment of any capital gains tax, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 862(6),
871(a)(2), such a tax will be paid upon distribution to the beneficiaries under the
throwback rules, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 643, 661-68. See Dale, supra note 53, at
22 n.16. But see Shop Talk, 34 J. TAX. 191 (1971).
119. Any excess in the fair market value over the present value of the annuity
would be treated as a gift to the transferee, Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 43, and
vice-versa. For a sample annuity agreement which would avoid the situation in which
a transfer would be treated as part gift, part sale, see Kanter & Horwood, supra note
118, at 406.
The present value of the annuity is calculated pursuant to Tress. Reg. § 20.2031-
10 (1977).
120. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 43.
121. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 43; Kanter, The Foreign Trust-A "One
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trustee could then sell the property with a stepped-up basis 2,
and reinvest the proceeds free from United States tax.2 3
Although not unique to foreign trusts, there were several
dangers inherent in the sales of annuities to trusts, the greatest
perhaps being that the sale would be disregarded and treated
as a transfer to the trust with a retained right to income for life,
thus subjecting the grantor to tax as the owner of the trust.'24
In Simon M. Lazarus, 25 for example, the Tax Court identi-
fied a number of factors which caused it to characterize such a
transaction as a transfer in trust with a reserved right to in-
come.'26 Most compelling in this decision were the facts that
the annual payments appeared intimately geared to the
amounts received as income by the trust; that no payments
could be made from the corpus, which would pass intact to the
remaindermen; and that the sale to the trust bore none of the
incidents of an arm's-length transaction.'
Nevertheless, the foreign trust/private annuity transaction
remained a viable vehicle for minimizing the tax burden on the
holder of appreciated securities. Amendments to section 1491
contained in the 1976 Tax Reform Act have severely limited the
usefulness of the device, however.
Whereas section 1491 formerly applied only to transfers of
stock and securities, the Act now extends the incidence of the
tax to the transfer of any property. 2 By doing this the Act has
in one broad stroke eliminated many schemes formulated to
circumvent the excise tax.' Another noteworthy change in this
World" Concept, supra note 115, at 503-504, 508-510.
122. Kanter, The Foreign Trust-A "One World" Concept, supra note 115, at 504.
123. See text accompanying notes 22-30 supra.
124. In such a case, the grantor who transfers the property to the trust will pay a
gift tax on the remainder, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2501(a); see Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-
3 (1977), from which no annual exclusion may be taken, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2503(b); the value of the assets of the trust will nevertheless be included in his
gross estate, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a)(1); and since the grantor will be treated
as the owner of the trust, he, and not the trust, will be liable for the tax on the trust
income. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671, 677(a).
125. 58 T.C. 854 (1972), aff'd, 513 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1975).
126. 58 T.C. at 867.
127. Cf. Mark Bixby, 58 T.C. 757 (1972) (transfer held to result in a grantor trust,
taxable under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 671).
128. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1491(1).
129. For example, the transfer of interests in a partnership, the principal assets
of which consisted of securities, might arguably have escaped the reach of section 1491,
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section is the increase in the excise tax rate from the previous
rate of 27 1/2 percent of the excess of the value of the securities
transferred over their adjusted basis. The Act has raised the
tax to 35 percent of the excess of the fair market value of the
property transferred over the adjusted basis of such property
plus the amount of gain recognized to the transferor at the time
of the transfer.
Although section 1491 was orginally intended to create a
substitute for the capital gains tax, the combined effect of
these two revisions in the 1976 Act will be to establish an anom-
alous tax structure which bears little relationship to the reali-
ties of the transactions involved. On one hand, the section
operates as a penalty provision, imposing a higher tax than
would otherwise be appropriate upon transferred property
which has not so greatly appreciated as to bring into effect the
maximum capital gains rate. On the other hand, a taxpayer
might seize the opportunity to transfer assets which would nor-
mally generate ordinary gain upon sale yet pay tax at only the
35 percent rate.
Congress was primarily motivated to amend the section in
response to abuses arising out of private annuity transactions
with foreign trusts. No longer will a taxpayer be permitted to
avoid the excise tax by selling appreciated assets to a foreign
trust and recognizing gain on a deferred basis. 30 The intent of
Congress is that the tax apply to all transfers, whether donative
or for full consideration,' and that the transferor be taxed on
the excess of the fair market value of the property over its
adjusted basis (i.e., inherent gain), reduced only by any gain
recognized at the time of the transfer. 32 In other words, as the
House Committee report states,
all sales and exchanges (including installment sales and private
annuity transactions), regardless of how any gain on these trans-
actions is reported, are within the scope of the excise tax provi-
sion. But to the extent the transferor immediately recognizes gain
although the taxpayer ran a considerable risk of having such interests themselves
classified as securities; now, however, such a transfer is clearly subject to the excise
tax. See Lerner, supra note 68, at 11.
130. See text accompanying note 121 supra.
131. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 213.
132. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1015(a), amending INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1491.
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in the transfer, the amount against which the tax is applied is
reduced.'
3 13
A principal drawback of the amended rule is its potential
for taxing gain twice, once by virtue of the excise tax on the
transfer and again by virtue of the capital gains tax upon distri-
bution. This situation arises as a result of the fact that the
transferee (i.e., the trust or the transferor to whom its owner-
ship is attributed) is permitted no step-up in the basis of the
transferred property, nor is the transferor allowed a credit
against income tax for the excise tax. 134 An even more harsh
application would result in the event the transferor is deemed
the owner of the trust pursuant to the newly enacted grantor
trust rule.
15
A less punitive, but equally anomalous, provision in the
section is the requirement that gain be calculated on the basis
of the fair market value of the transferred property. 36 While
probably no different in application from "value," use of fair
market value may result in a higher taxable gain than would
be possible were appreciation measured on the basis of
"amount realized.' ' 37 Even though the "fair market value" ter-
minology may be necessary to embrace donative transfers as
well as arm's-length sales, in the latter circumstance the tax-
payer may pay what is in effect a capital gains tax on more gain
than was actually realized.
Although not entirely relevant to a discussion of foreign
trusts, the excise tax is not applicable to transfers by or to
nonresident alien individuals. 3 ' Thus, while such a transaction
would probably not enable a taxpayer to elude the grantor trust
rules, 39 a sale of appreciated property to a foreign individual,
133. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 213.
134. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1014(a), adding INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 679.
This conclusion seems to follow logically from Rev. Rul. 69-450, 1969-2 CUM. BULL.
168, which held that a transferor who was deemed to be the owner of a foreign trust
and thus required to report all its income was nonetheless responsible for paying the
section 1491 tax. See New York State Bar Ass'n, supra note 48, at 282 & nn.35, 36.
135. Cf. id., at 284.
136. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1015(a), amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1491.
137. See Alpert & Feingold, Tax Reform Act Toughens Foreign Transfer Provi-
sions of 1491 and Liberalizes 367, 46 J. TAX. 2, 3 (1977).
138. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1491, as amended by 1976 Tax Reform Act,
§ 1015(a).
139. See H.R. REP. No. 94-658, at 209; see generally text accompanying notes 64-
65 supra.
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who could not be subject to the 35 percent tax, would not create
problems of double taxation. In addition, section 1491 presum-
ably does not apply to transfers by an estate. No excise tax
would be imposed on the creation of a testamentary foreign
trust. 140 Such an exception may prove significant in light of the
enactment of provisons requiring a carryover of basis of prop-
erty acquired from a decedent.'
Finally, the amendments to section 1491 promise to in-
crease the difficulty of conducting ordinary commercial trans-
actions with a foreign trust. Even though a party completing
an arm's-length sale with a foreign trust may recognize all gain
at the time of the transfer, it may nonetheless be necessary to
file a return,' or at least obtain a determination by the Secre-
tary that the transfer was not one in pursuance of a plan whose
principal purpose is the avoidance of income tax.4 3 Moreover,
certain contributions to foreign corporations and transfers to
foreign partnerships are also included in the breadth of the
excise tax provisions. In view of the fact that the 1976 amend-
ments were enacted specifically in response to perceived abuses
out of transactions with foreign trusts,' it is certainly possible
to question the propriety of extending the complexity of these
amendments to circumstances where similar abuses have not
been documented.1
Pursuant to section 1057, which was added to the 1976 Tax
Reform Act by the Senate Finance Committee, 4 ' a taxpayer
may elect to treat a transfer otherwise taxable under section
1491 as a sale or exchange of property for an amount equal to
its fair market value.'47 The taxpayer must recognize as gain
140. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1491, as amended by 1976 Tax Reform Act,
§ 1015(a).
141. See Alpert & Feingold, supra note 137, at 2.
142. Treas. Reg. § 1.1494-1 (1977).
143. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1492(2), 1494(b).
144. This appears implicit in the fact that the only legislative history relating to
the excise tax can be found in the sections of the committee reports dealing with foreign
trusts. See, e.g., H.R. RP. No. 94-658, at 213-14.
145. Indeed, one might also doubt the need for such highly technical additions to
the Code where the potential for tax avoidance inherent in foreign trusts is great, yet
apparently only rarely ripens into actuality. See text accompanying notes 2-5 supra;
see also New York State Bar Ass'n, supra note 48, at 281, which questions the very
efficacy of section 1491.
146. See S. REP. No. 94-1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 456 (1976) (Conference Com-
mittee Report).
147. 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1015(c), adding INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1057.
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the excess of the fair market value of the transferred property
over its adjusted basis in his hands.' 8 The problem of double
taxation posed by section 1491 would be avoided under such an
election, since the transferee in a section 1057 transaction is
permitted to increase his basis in the property according to the
amount of gain recognized by the transferor.",
There is scant legislative history on this provision, and the
precise contours of its applicability remain uncertain. As an
addition to subpart 0, it is clearly designed to approximate
more closely than section 1491 a tax on gains to property trans-
ferred to a foreign trust. As such, this new section presumably
imposes a tax only on transfers made for full and adequate
consideration. The computation of taxable gain, however, is
made on the basis of fair market value rather than amount
realized, again leaving open the possibility that the amount to
which the tax applies will not be equivalent to the actual gain
realized. 50
Most curiously, the section 1057 computation is no differ-
ent from that involved in section 1491 prior to amendment.
While the statutory context would seem to imply that all gain
be recognized at the time of the transfer,'"' failure of Congress
148. Id. The problem of double taxation posed by section 1491 would be avoided
since the transferee in a section 1057 transaction is permitted to increase his basis in
the property according to the amount of gain recognized by the transferor.
149. S. REP. No. 94-938, at 223.
Presumably, a taxpayer who elects to treat a transfer as a sale or exchange under
section 1057 of the Code, in lieu of paying the section 1491 excise tax, should not fall
within the scope of the grantor trust provisons. See Alpert & Feingold, supra note 137,
at 4.
It should be noted that while section 1057 merely requires the transferor to recog-
nize gain from the sale or exchange, section 679(a)(2)(B) requires that gain be recog-
nized and realized at the time of the transfer. It should not, then, be possible to fund
a foreign trust using a section 1057 election and take advantage of the section
679(a)(2)(B) exception, since the unfunded trust would not be capable of furnishing
the full and adequate consideration apparently required in a section 679(a)(2)(B) sale
or exchange. No conclusion is reached here whether it might be feasible to sell property
to a foreign trust at its fair market value in exchange for payments made by the trust
on an installment basis, where the payments might bear some relation to the expected
earnings of the trust and where the transferor would defer recognition of the section
1057 gain until the payments were received. If the transferor made such an installment
sale, but did not elect to pay the section 1057 tax, he would be subject to the section
1491 excise tax, since section 1491 taxes all appreciation that is not reduced by gain
recognized at the time of the transfer.
150. Cf. text accompanying note 137 supra.
151. See Alpert & Feingold, supra note 137, at 4. Indeed, it is possible that Con-
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to so state lends support to the argument that a taxpayer may
utilize the section 1057 election in, for example, a private annu-
ity or installment sale transaction, where recognition of taxable
gain is deferred. Congress surely cannot have intended to mod-
ify section 1491 so as to foreclose such transactions then reen-
act it in substantially similar form, yet the ambiguity of section
1057 does nothing to prevent one's reaching such a conclusion.
V. CONCLUSION
It is easily discernable that the creature known as the for-
eign trust has been substantially altered by the Tax Reform
Act of 1976. What was once a readily available form of tax
avoidance has been transformed into a mere shell of itself.
Unless used as an estate planning device a foreign situs trust
now may be more liability than asset to its creator.
Some of the changes implemented by the Act may be
thought of as harsh. Regardless of the seeming severity, Con-
gress's goal of closing a tax avoidance loophole appears to have
been met. Until the regulations concerning this portion of the
Act are released it is mere speculation to comment on the effec-
tiveness of the changes. However, it is to be expected that the
regulations will be in agreement with the legislative intent.
Therefore, based upon existing information, the foreign situs
trust can no longer be thought of as a means of tax avoidance.
gress simply assumed that the references to section 1491 in section 1057 were sufficient
to incorporate the legislative history behind the excise tax provisions into section 1057.
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